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INSURANCE
HERBERT A. KUVINO

The Florida legislature, state courts and federal courts have been
very active relative to insurance law. Following in brief text form are
the Florida decisions and recently enacted statutes which are pertinent
to the general law of insurance. No attempt has been made to set forth
any cases involving workman's compensation law except those decisions
pertaining to the making, interpretation and enforcement of insurance
policies.
REGULATION OF INSURANCE BUSINESS

Taxation of premiums.-An insurance company sought a declaratory
decree and a mandatory injunction to compel the Insurance Commissioner
to return to the company the one percent tax which had been levied
by various municipalities against the gross receipts of the policy premiums
executed by the company. The chancellor entered a decree in favor of
the company which on appeal was affirmed by the Supreme Court.' Both
courts, in construing Florida Statutes Chapter 175 (1949) and Florida
Statutes Chapter 19112 (1939), held that the intent of the legislature
relative to the proviso which exempts those companies not taxed by the
state, is to free them from taxation by the cities also. Since the company,
a domestic corporation, is exempted from state taxation, under the sectious
above, it is not required to pay any tax on premiums to the various
municipalities considered by the statute. Therefore it is entitled to the
return of the monies which it had paid under protest.
Supervision of policy provisions.-In this case, 2 the controversy involved
the statutory power of the Insurance Commissioner to disapprove the
policy of insurers with requisite notice and hearing. The trial court
entered a decree construing Florida Statutes Sections 642.01 and 642.02.
The Insurance Commissioner appealed. The decision was affirmed in
part and reversed in part. It was held that the notice of disapproval of
policy forms which stated that the forms contained provisions which
were "unjust, inequitable and contrary to law and public policy," and
which, in the specifications, recited inadequacies of benefits in relation
to premiums received, was a sufficient notice, since the notice itself
was not conclusive and a hearing was contemplated. Also, the insurer
had its remedy by certiorari if it was dissatisfied with the outcome in
such hearing.
*Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
New Jersey Bars.

Member of the Florida and

1. Larson v. American Title & Ins. Co., 52 So.2d 816 (Ila. 1951).
2. Larson v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 64 So.2d 322 (Fla. 1953).
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SCOPE AND

COVERAGE

As to insured.-This action rose out of a workmen's compensation
claim against B, as employer.3 The employee successfully prosecuted his
'Ile deputy
compensation claim against the insurance company.
commissioncr held that the policy issued by said carrier did not insure
B, the individual. On appeal, the Industrial Commissioner held B was
individually covered and reversed the deputy commissioner. On further
appeal the circuit court held that the policy, as written and delivered,
did cover B as an individual, It appeared that B and the agent of the
carrier wrote the policy to insure:
Harry Blumberg, d/b/a B & S Fruit Company. Individual,
co-partnership, corporation-or estate? Corporation.
It described the classification as orchards and vineyards and covered all
operations including fruit pickers, drivers, chauffeurs and their helpers. The
policy also contained standard form undescribed operations endorsement
and named B without further description. The facts further indicated
that the corporation was inactive for quite some time; that B owned
extensive groves, including town and other rental properties which lie
administered personally, and this was known to the insurance company
since it audited his books to arrive at the insurance premiums chargeable
for this policy. The court stated that since the policies are prepared by
the company, the insured may never read them unless some controversy
arises as to their coverage. The law does not require the assured to read
the policy. There was no suggestion of fraud and no mutual mistake
of fact; the mistake involved was committed by the scrivener in reducing
the policy to writing. Therefore, the mistake could be corrected by
the Industrial Commission in accordance with the original intent of
the parties. It was further held that under Florida Statutes, Section 440.41,
the Industrial Commission has the authority and power to interpret a
policy under the circumstances in this case.
Contract to provide liability insurance.-Plaintiffs sued for injuries
sutained in a store by the falling of a ceiling tile. 4 The defendants
cross-claimed against a third party, claiming that under a contract with
the store owner the third party had agreed to indemnify them against
public liability arising out of the installation of air conditioning equipment
in the store. The cross complaint was dismissed and judgment of
exoneration was entered in favor of all the defendants except the store
owner. It was held that in the absence of clear and unequivocal terms
in a contract, an agreement of a contractor to procure public liability
insurance would be construed to be a contract to indemnify only against
the negligence of the indemnitor, not of the indemnitee. The court
based its finding upon the well known principle that there can be no
3. Blumberg v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 51 So.Zd 182 (17a. 1951).

INSURANCE
contribution between joint tortfeasors and, therefore, the store owner, as
defendant, could not complain or even appeal from the judgment rendered
in favor of the other defendant even though the judgment held against him.
Encroachment by "accident."-Plaintiff obtained a judgment for
declaratory decree on a policy issued by defendant. The Supreme Court
of Florida reversed on appeal. 5 The policy issued by the defendant was
a property damage liability policy whereby the company agreed to pay
on behalf of the insured all sums which lie shall be obliged to pay by
reason of the liability imposed upon him by law for damage because'of
injury to or destruction of property "caused by accident" and arising
out of the hazards such as ownership, maintenance or use of the property
or all operations necessary or incidental thereto. The plaintiff procured
a survey from a registered surveyor. Based upon the survey and the
stakes placed on the premises owned by plaintiff, le constructed a building
thereon. Plaintiff was an experienced contractor and builder by profession.
Subsequently, it was discovered that the plaintiff had erected the building
on part of the premises owned by the adjoining neighbor and said
encroachment was occasioned by the error caused by the surveyor.
Plaintiff paid the owner of the adjoining lot a sum of money to satisfy
the adjoining owner's damages. Thereupon the plaintiff notified the
defendant company of the claim. Ile insurance company denied liability
under the policy. The court held:
An effect which is the natural and probable consequence of an
act or cause of action is not an 'accident.' The effect which was
the natural and probable consequence of the plaintiff's act in
erecting the building was the encroachment on the adjoining
property. This is true whether the plaifitiff knew the facts as
they were or understood them to be other than they were.
The result or effect would be the same.
The court chose to ground its decision by finding that the plaintiffs action
was the result of a "mistake" and therefore there was no liability under
the policy which grounded company liability on "accident."
CONCEALMENT,

REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

"Sound health" clauses.-Plaintiff, wife of assured, as beneficiary,
sued for the amount due on a life policy after the death of her
husband.6 The policy was issued on an application without requirement
of medical examination but contained a clause providing that only
premiums were returnable "if within two years prior to issue of policy
the assured required medical or surgical treatment." 'The agent for the
company took the application from the assured on July 20th. On the
4. Jackson v. Florida Weather-Makers Inc., 55 So.2d 575 (Fla. 1951).
5. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Gerrets, 65 So.Zd 69 (Fla. 1953).
6. Johnson v. Life Ins. Co. of Georgia, 52 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1951).
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same day assured was examined by a doctor and sent to another doctor
who x-rayed his chest, and on July 25th diagnosed the ailment as
tuberculosis. The policy was issued on the same day and was delivered
to the assured by the agent of the company several days thereafter. It
is uncontroverted that assured was not in "good health" at delivery of
the policy and that company's agent had actual knowledge of the tubercular
condition of assured two months after delivery of the policy. It was held
that the collection of premiums by the agent after such knowledge,
constituted a waiver of the violation of the "good health" clause and
the misrepresentation by the assured.
Physical history of assured.-Widow, as beneficiary, brought an action
on a life policy. 7 The insurance company denied liability, claiming false
representations by assured as to his physical history on his application.
On appeal it was held that there was apparent evidence that fraud in the
procurement of the policy was practiced by the assured and a judgment
in favor of the defendant was entered.
Refusal of other insurance.-Plaintiff sued to recover on a marine
insurance policy.8 One ground of defense was that the plaintiff represented
that no underwriter had ever refused insurance to him on the boat involved
and that said representation was untrue, false, misleading and material
to the risk thereby invalidating the insurance policy sued upon. It
appeared that the plaintiff had made application to an insurer and was
refused insurance without any reason being stated. He then made
application to a broker who in turn made application to the same
insurer for coverage, and said broker was advised of the refusal previously
rendered on this risk. A jury verdict in favor of the defendant insurance
company was affirmed on reargument.
AcENCY
Agency in insurance.-It was held that an agent who solicits life
insurance policies, delivers the policy to the assured and continues to
collect the installment premiums thereon is the general agent of the
insurance company and that information or knowledge acquired by him,
even though not communicated by him to the company, is knowledge
imputed to and binding on the company."
Fidelity and surety.-It was held that the rule is well settled in
this country that knowledge communicated to an agent or officer of a
corporation is not notice to the corporation in matters involving or
applicable to fidelity and surety bonds so as to relieve or discharge the
7. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Ferguson, 52 So.2d 371 (Mla. 1952).
8. Adams v. Royal Exchange Assurance, 62 So.2d 591 (Fi. 1953).
9. See note 6 supra.
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surety. 10 In this matter a fideity bond was placed on the office
manager of the defendant. He misappropriated defendant's funds. The
bond contained the provision that "the bond shall be deemed terminated
as to any employee as soon as the insured shall learn of any dishonest
or fraudulent acts on the part of such employee." The plaintiff bonding
company attempted to rely on the testimony of a former secretary-treasurer
of the corporation that lie obtained knowledge of the employee's
misappropriation, but the other officers of the corporation testified that
the corporation had no such notice. A jury verdict in favor of the
indemnified corporation was affirmed.
Apparent scope.-A bank sued for an accounting and recovery of
unearned premiums not paid to it on policies which had been cancelled,
but upon which the bank had paid the full premiums under premium loan
transactions between the assured and the agent of the defendant insurance
company." It appeared that the assured, unable to pay the full premium
for the three or five year term of fire insurance, would execute a premium
loan contract with the insurance company agent. He in turn delivered
the same to the bank, which paid the full premium, and by the terms
of the contract, the assured was to have paid the bank installments
agreed upon. However, when the policies were cancelled and the
unearned premiums were returned, they were sent back by the insurance
company to its agent instead of directly to the bank. The agent kept
the returned unearned premiums. The bank sued the insurance company.
Since the insurance company's agent was to receive premiums and return
unearned premiums to the persons entitled to them, the court held that
the company was liable for the agent's failure to do so, and the bank
had a right to rely upon the agent's apparent authority since there were
no circumstances which put the bank upon notice or inquiry relative to
the agent's special or limited authority.
Adjuster's authority.-It was held that a fire adjuster, employed by
the company, who met with the assured, valued the merchandise damaged
and advised him that he would hear from the company in due course,
had authority to waive proof of loss either in writing or orally by matter
in pais which amounted to an estoppe .122
WAIVER AND EsToPPEL

Acceptance of premiums with knowledge.-This case followed the
familiar rule that a forfeiture of rights under an insurance policy is not
favored by the law, especially where the forfeiture is sought after the
10. Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Union Finance Co., 54 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1951).
11. Industrial Ins. Co. of N. J. v. First Nat. Bank of Miami, 57 So.2d 23 (Fla. 1952).
12. Guarantee Mut'i. Fire Ins. Co. v. Jacobs, 57 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1952).
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happening of an event which gives rise to the insurer's liability. It is
well settled that when an insurer has knowledge of facts which would
justify the forfeiture of assured's policy, any unequivocal act which recognizes
the continued existence of the policy amounts to a waiver. The
court said:
. . . the intention to waive such rights may be inferred fron a
deliberate disregard of information sufficient to excite attention
and call for inquiry as to the existence of facts by reason of which
a forfeiture could be declared . . . Constructive notice may be

the legal equivalent of knowledge, in the sense that circumstances
putting the insurer on notice may not be deliberately
disregarded . .

.

Filing of proofs of loss.-It was held that the action of the adjuster
and agent of the company, after being advised of the loss, in informing
the assured that he would hear from the company in due course, waived
the requirement of the filing of the proofs of loss as required by the
4
policy.,
Necessity for pleading.-The plaintiff started an action against the
defendant insurance company, as beneficiary under a life insurance policy."
The defendant by its answer denied liability claiming that the assured
made false representations as to his physical history on the application
upon which the policy was issued. The plaintiff failed to file a replication.
At the trial the plaintiff, over the objection of the defendant, introduced
evidence to prove estoppel or waiver. It was held that since waiver and
estoppel was the main issue on which the case was decided and it was
not affirmatively pleaded, the defendant was not on notice of such issue.
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court on the ground that it
erroneously permitted evidence to be presented relative to the waiver or
estoppel.
Effect of denial of liability.-The court held where an insurance
company, by its letter, after notice of loss, denies liability under its
policy, it does so on the ground of coverage and, therefore, is estopped
to defend on the defense of failure of timely notice.16
RiciuTs

OF PARTIES

Assured.-The court will ascertain the intent of the parties to an
insurance contract and will designate such assured as was actually intended
and correct mistakes in that connection. This decision held:
Insurance policies arc prepared by the insurance company and
as is the case the insured may never read them unless sonic
13. See note 6 sn/ira.
14. See note 10 supra.
15. See note 7 su/ra.
16. Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Oceano Towing Co., 197 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1952).
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controversy arises
as to their coverage.
7
him to do so.'

'[he law does not require

Assignee.-The controversy was whether a bank had a right to charge
against the life insurance policy proceeds which decedent-assured had
assigned to it as collateral security for monies received by the decedent
from the bank during his lifetime. The bank was allowed recovery to
the full extent of the monies which assured had received from it during
his lifetime, since the assignment of the policies was for collateral security
for any and all liability of the assured, either then existing or which
might thereafter arise in the ordinary course of business between the
assured and the assignee.'8
Conditional vendor and vendee.-B bought a lalf interest in a truck
secured by a loan to the bank. Later B bought the other half interest
and advised the bank to have the insurance policy amended to show his
sole ownership. He was informed by the bank that the policy had
been properly taken care of and continued to make payments on his
loan to the bank. The truck burned. The bank had failed to have the
policy amended as agreed. The court held that since the bank had
knowledge of all of the transactions by B and undertook to carry out the
transfer of insurance, it was liable for the loss which he sustained to
his truck.' 9
Subrogee.-An insurance company which pays a loss under its policy
to its assured and takes back a "loan receipt" has the legal right to
enforce the claim against the tortfeasor in the name of its assured and
is not required to sue in the name of its assured to the use of said
20
insurance company.
USE OF DECLATORY JUDGMENT

ACTION

An insurance company filed an action for a declaratory judgment to
determine whether or not it was obligated under its policy to defend
actions on behalf of the person who operated the assured's car with the
assured's permission and whether or not it was required to pay any
judgments on behalf of said driver since said driver was insured
individually and separately.2 It was held that no part of the insurance
contract is questioned as to validity or construction. There must be some
doubt as to the existence or non-existence of some right, statute, immunity,
power or privilege which may be at stake under a deed, will, contract,
article, memorandum or instrument in writing. Ilere is only a factual
question involved in this case since it is disputed as to whether or not
17. See note 3 subra.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Silva v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Tampa, 56 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1951).
First Nat. Bank of Tarpon Springs v. Bliss, 56 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1952).
Gould v. Weibel, 62 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1952).
Columbia Casualty Co. v. Zimmerman, 62 So.2d 338 (Fla. 1952).
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the driver was operating the automobile of the assured with assured's
consent.
BLANKET FIDELITY BOND

Plaintiff was protected by a blanket indemnity bond against loss
by dishonest act of any of its employees and for the faithful performance
of the prescribed duties of such employees. 22 Plaintiff's treasurer carelessly
and negligently used or permitted the use of funds of plaintiff in honoring
and cashing forty-six drafts bearing the forged or unauthorized indorsements
of the payees thereof without requiring the bearers, who presented such
drafts, to indorse them in person before him. Upon discovery, plaintiff's
bank charged plaintiff's account with the amounts. The surety company
refused to make good this amount, maintaining that the payment to the
bank by the plaintiff was a "voluntary payment." Judgment was for the
plaintiff.
MARINE INSURANCE

An insurance carrier was ordered to pay the liability imposed upon
the owner of the tug boat for injuries caused to the owner of the boat
being towed by the assured while said owner was on board his own boat
as the crew thereof.23 The court held that the owner and crew of the
towed boat were not passengers of the insured tug within the intendment
of the "passenger hazard" exclusion clause.
COOPERATION CLAUSE

The plaintiff, insured under an automobile liability policy, brought
a Florida statutory garnishment proceeding against the insurer oi a
judgment obtained for personal injuries arising out of an automobile
collision.24 The defense was that the insured had breached the "cooperation
clause" of the policy. It was held to be prejudicial error to permit the
plaintiff to retry a damage suit to show that the evidence for recovery
in it was so strong that cooperation could not have changed the result.
The failure to cooperate was immaterial, since the retrial prevented a
fair trial on the issue of non-cooperation.
CONSTRUCTION

OF

POLICIES

Intent of parties.-The evidence as to the intent of the parties to
an insurance contract will be accepted and given examination by the court,
rather than the wording of the contract and it will be interpreted in
25
accordance with the express intent of the parties.
22. King Edward Employees Federal Credit Union v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 206

F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1953).
23. See note 16 suPra.
24. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Rexford, 197 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1952).
25. See note 3 supra.
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Ambiguity.-Where contracts and statutes are ambiguous, interpretation
may be necessary. Where the court is confronted with a contract, the
meaning of which was well understood and settled by prior decisions,
the court is not at liberty to modify it by interpretation even though
the court may modify judge-made rules for better conformity with
justice . 6
Theft.-The word "theft" comprehends essentially the wilful taking
or appropriation of one person's property by another wrongfully and
without justification and with design to hold or make use of it in
violation of the rights of the true owner. The intent to deprive the true
27
owner of the property is a necessary ingredient of the offense.
Notice of cancellation.-In interpreting a provision in a policy the
court held that the mere mailing of the notice to the address of the
assured was compliance causing a cancellation of the contract. 2 It was
stated:
We cannot stretch the rule of strict construction of insurance
contracts in favor of the insured to mean that where the language
is plain and unambiguous it may be given an added meaning.
The contract here contains nothing at all about the receipt of
the notice, but only about its mailing, and with that simple
provision there seems to be meticulous compliance.
Surety contracts.-Where the owner brought an action against the
surety for indemnification of loss sustained due to the alleged failure
of a contractor to properly perform the building contract, the court held
that the strict application of the common law rule of surety is not now
applied in cases of compensated sureties.2 9
Group life policies.-In a case involving the change of a beneficialy
designated in a group policy, the court reiterated that the Florida courts
follow the strict interpretation of policy requirements for a change of
beneficiary in ordinary life policies issued to the individuals, but that in
group policies the equity rule will be applied.30
ATTORNEY's FEES

Two cases involving the question of attorney's fees under Florida
Statutes Section 625.08 were decided by the courts. One, on a fidelity
bond, 1 held that this class of cases did not come within the statutory
provision for attorney's fees. The other case 32 involved an action in the
Florida state courts on an insurance policy issued and delivered in another
state. There the court held that since insurance is a business affected
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Pafford v. Standard Life Ins. Co. of Indiana, 52 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1951).
State Assurance Underwriters v. Miller, 58 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1952).
Bradley v. Associates Discount Corp., 58 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1952).
Gibbs v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 62 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1952).
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 102 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Fla. 1952).
See note 10 spra.
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with a public interest and is subject to the reasonable regulation of the
state and, further, that the statute is a procedural provision; it is more
or less a part of the insurance contract as much as the other statutes
which become part of the contract by their terms.
PROCESS OF UNAIrORIZED

FOREIGN

INSURERS

Two cases came before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals involving
the question of Florida Statutes Sections 625.28-625.33, commonly known
as the "Florida Unauthorized Insurers Process Act." Both cases were by
the same plaintiff but against different insurers, each of whom was not
authorized to transact business in the State of Florida. In the first case, " ,
the defendant, insurer, operated a mail order insurance business from
Iowa. It had no office in Florida. No agents solicited any of its business
in Florida. It transacted all its business by mail with the assured. At
the time the assured received his policy by mail in 1950 lie was a resident
of Florida. Assured had mailed all his membership assessments regularly
to the company's Iowa office. Upon his death, forms for proof of death
were received from and returned to the company by mail. The court
held that under the above mentioned 1949 statute, service of process
upon the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Florida, in accordance
with the terms of the statute, was not a denial of due process of law.
However, the court expressly stated that it limited its construction,
with relation to process, on insurance delivered in Florida to Florida
residents subsequent to the passage of the statute. The Act could not
have any retroactive effect upon unauthorized insurers having policies in
force prior to the enactment of the statute.
In the second case,"4 the service of process was quashed by the
court because it appeared that the defendant delivered the policy by
mail to the assured in 1936 while he was a resident of Kentucky. The
assured moved to Florida in 1946 and resided here until his death in
1951. It was held that the statute passed in 1949 would have no effect
upon the defendant company's rights vhich had accrued prior to the
passage of the statute.
STATUTORY ENACTMENTS

Foreign insurance companies: Credits.-his statute provides that a

foreign insurance company which owns and substantially occupies any
building in the State of Florida as a regional home office for an area
of three or more states will be entitled to certain credits on the premium
receipts taxed . 5
32. Feller v. Equitable Life Ass'n, 57 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1952).
33. Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Mens Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1953).
34. Parmalee v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Ace. Ass'n of Am., 206 F.2d 523
(5th Cir. 1953).
35. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 27989.
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Fire, casualty and surety insurance.-This statute amends several of
the previous sections relative to non-admitted insurers, their resident agents
or supervisory general agents and provides for the procedure in connection
therewith."
Agents exaination.-The Insurance Commissioner is permitted to
87
issue a single license to transact life, accident and health insurance.
Group life insurance.-The amendment permits insurers to issue policies
to trustees of a fund established by one or more employers and one or
more labor unions as policy holders, to insure the employees and members
of said organizations 8 8
Group, accident and sickness insurance.-This permits a single group
coverage for all employees of corporations under common control and
defines such insurance to include summer camps, religious, instructive or
recreational meetings, 9
Capital stock of insurance and surety companies.-Capital stock may
be divided into three classes, and insurance and surety companies may
establish two or more classes of each kind and may increase or reduce
the same as law will allow. Preferred stock may not be more than
0
two-thirds of the actual paid up capital.'
Investments by domestic corporations.-A comprehensive enactment
relates to domestic life insurance company investments. It specifies
which securities are eligible for investments, reserves and capital and
provides a penalty for the violation thereof and repeals all laws in conflict
therewith.41
Accident and sickness insurance.-Provision is made for uniform
accident or sickness insurance policies. The terms, conditions, provisions,
2
form and style of these policies are specified in the statute.'
Names of insurance companies.-Insurers are required to submit the
name under which they intend to operate to the Insurance Commissioner
for his approval. The Commissioner must provide notice to other insurers
whose name might be adversely affected, giving them the right to file
objections within twenty days. If the Commissioner approves, insurers
adversely affected have sixty days to institute an action in the Circuit
Court of Leon County for review of the ruling."
36. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28002, amendatory of FLA. STAT. §§ 627.55(6), 627.57,
627.59(3), 627.61 and 627.62.
37. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28004, proposed FLA. STAT. § 634.07(4).
38. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28005, amendatory of the first paragraph of FLA. STAT. §
635.24(4).
39. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28006 amendatory of FLA. STAT. §§ 642.04(2) and 642.06.
40. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28010 amendatory of FLA. STAT. §§ 611.06 and 625.02.
41. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28015 is new and became effective Oct. 15, 1953.
42. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28027 amendatory of FLA. STAT. c. 642 by adding this to
§O642.03(1), and continues §§ 642.04(1) and 642.03 under special circumstances until
Oct. 1, 1956, upon which date they will be repealed.
43. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28066 is entirely new.

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Agents character report.-Isurance company officials are required to
keep on file a full and complete detailed report on the credit and character
of each individual qualifying as an accident and health insurance agent
for the first time.44
Insurance adjusters.-Florida Statutes Chapter 636 is repealed. The
new enactment applies to fire, casualty, marine and surety insurance
policy contracts and the adjustment of claims arising thereunder. It
states that it is for the purpose of protecting the interest of the public
with respect to insurance adjusters and makes provision to regulate their
business."'
Agents and solicitors.-A new statute is applicable to all agents and
solicitors other than those engaged in title insurance, health and accident
or life insurance. It is for the regulation and conduct of the business
of insurance agents and solicitors, their examination and licensing, and
it invests certain powers and authority in the Insurance Commissioner
to administer the act.'6
Temporary licenses of life agents.-At the request of an insurer of
industrial or ordinary-combination class, a person may have issued to him
a temporary license as a life insurance agent provided he takes an
examination within ninety days thereafter. If he fails the examination,
Commissioner,
his license ceases automatically, unless it is extended by the 47
examination.
second
the
of
at his discretion, until the taking
Insurance trade practices.-Certainsections of this statute are amended
pertaining to the definition of the word "person." Anti-coercion by the
mortgagee and "twisting" is prohibited. The penalty provision of the
statute was changed to provide for the revocation of the license, after
by the
notice of a hearing for violation of a cease and desist order
48
Commissioner. The violation is punishable as a misdemeanor.
Alien fire and casualty companies.-A new provision designated as
Florida Statutes Chapter 631 sets forth all of the conditions and provisions
fire and casualty insurance companies
to be complied with by foreign
49
transacting business in Florida.
STATUTES, NOT PURELY INSURANCE,

BlUT

AFFECTING THE INSURANCE

BusINESS

Maintenance or personal care agreements.-A 1953 enactment provides
that all agreements whereby a person or firm undertakes, for a consideration
44, Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28067 amendatory of FLA. STAT. § 627.43 by adding a new
paragraph subsection (3) thereto and changing the present (3) to subsection (4).
45. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28074, repealing FLA. STAT. c. 636 and enacting this law in
its place.
46. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28075 is new and will be designated as FIA. STAT. C.627.
47. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28179, amendatory of FLA. STAT. § 634.09(1).
48. Ia. Laws 1953, c. 28188, amendatory of FLA. STAT. §§ 643.02(1), 643.04
subsections (8) (b)(2), and (10), (11), and 643.11.
49. Fla. Laws 1953, c.28189 is new and will be designated as FLA. STAT. c. 631.
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paid in advance or for fees, to care for another for the duration of the
other person's life or a term of years, is a business coupled and executed
with a public interest and subjects it to the regulation of the Insurance
Commissioner. The necessity of procuring a certificate of authority is
also set forth. This act contains provisions and regulations usually found
in acts pertaining to the regulation of the insurance business.'
Burial contracts.-A new act requires that those making contracts which
provide for the burial of persons upon the prepayment of sums of money
comply with conditions akin to provisions imposed upon insurance
companies transacting business in the state. It further requires persons
or firms making these contracts to obtain from the Insurance Commissioner
a certificate of authority to write such "pre-need burial contracts," and
the Commissioner is given authority to regulate the business. Penalties
for violation of any of the terms of the Act are set forth also. 1
Excise tax on documents.-Mention is made here of the amendment
to Florida Statutes Section 201.08, since it raises the question whether it
will make the act apply to insurance policies, especially on contracts of
endowment or annunities. Subsection one provides that the tax shall
apply on:
. . written
v
obligations to pay money, . . . made, executed,
delivered, sold, transferred, or assigned to in the State of Florida,
and for each renewal of the same on each one hundred dollars
of the indebtedness or obligation extended thereby, the tax shall
be ten cents ....
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Commission on interstate cooperation.-The general purpose of this
new statute53 is to help the state cooperate and participate as a member
of the Council of State Governments; to assist in procuration and
formulation of, among other functions, the enactment of uniform and
reciprocal statutes and administrative rules and regulations, and the
interchange and clearance of research and information. The Council of
State Governments is described to be a joint governmental agency of
Florida and the other states which cooperate through it. The composition
of the committee is set forth in the act.
50. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28190 is new. While this properly does not come under
the classification of insurance law, nevertheless, it is, by this legislation, treated as in
the nature of insurance transactions and is being made the subject of the same kind of
regulation and supervision.
51. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28211 is new and will be designated as FLA. STAT. c. 639.
52. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28216, amendatory of FLA. STAT. § 201.08. While this
subject is not truly insurance law, the writer has placed it here to question whether it
can be construed that the legislature intended that insurance transactions, such as
assignments, pledging, designation of beneficiaries, even the making of insurance
contracts can be construed to he included within the terms, "written obligations to
pay money," and, therefore, are subject to the excise tax on the documents evidencing
the same.
53. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28292 is new. This act may indirectly have some effect
upon the administration and regulation of the insurance business and policy forms, etc.

